

78-3640

21 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Retention of Classification of
Unevaluated Intelligence Reports

1. Action Requested: Approval of declassification policy described herein and signature of letter to the Archivist.

2. Background:

a. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) on 22 April 1977 determined that unevaluated intelligence reports disseminated by the Operations Directorate to agencies within the Intelligence Community are permanent records because these reports constitute a record of the dissemination of foreign intelligence collected by the Agency. Furthermore, large numbers of these reports have already been accessioned to NARS as permanent records by other U.S. Government agencies.

b. All permanent records are subject to systematic review for declassification as required in Executive Order 11652 and, as of 1 December 1978, Executive Order 12065. Documents twenty years of age, thirty years as to foreign government information, must be declassified unless the agency head certifies that continued classification is required for national security reasons.

c. The classification review of unevaluated intelligence reports produced in the period 1946-50 has raised serious questions regarding the declassification and release of unevaluated reports. Although the substance of individual reports often does not merit continued classification, items in the report format, such as "Place Acquired", provide evidence of CIA operations and of liaison relationships which warrant continued protection. Also, "Source" descriptions, even though general, pinpoint sectors within

*11652 — but will
do same as 12065*

a country from which agents were reporting to CIA and tend to reveal liaison relationships. Such revelations of CIA operations, even though thirty years old, would not be viewed kindly by the country concerned. A further risk is posed by the declassification and release of a group of reports, on a specific country or topic, which individually would do no harm but in the aggregate reveal CIA interests and scope of operations during a given time frame. CIA has to provide guidance to NARS for conducting the classification review of unevaluated CIA reports accessioned to NARS as permanent records by other government agencies. It is our intention to maintain classification of all such reports and instruct NARS personnel to act accordingly. This will eliminate the document-by-document review now conducted.

d. The problem of protecting CIA equities while carrying out the intent of the Executive Orders to declassify as much information as possible was raised with Mr. Edwin Alan Thompson, Director, Records Declassification Division (NARS). Recognizing that the substantive content of many unevaluated reports does not justify continued classification, Mr. Thompson discussed the continued protection of these reports because of their revealing format with the Deputy Archivist, Dr. James E. O'Neill. In their view, categorizing unevaluated intelligence reports in order to retain classification of the reports as a class is a feasible solution to protect CIA equities.

e. It is concluded that CIA can and should continue to retain classification on all unevaluated intelligence reports for the reasons stated and in the light of the position taken by the National Archives and Records Service. If these reports are subsequently requested under the Freedom of Information Act or mandatory review provisions of Executive Order 12065, they can be reviewed by CIA for possible sanitization and release of non-sensitive information.

3. Staff Position: This matter has been coordinated with the Office of General Counsel, and DDO/IMS fully concurs in the position taken above.

4. Recommendation: That you approve as Agency declassification policy that unevaluated intelligence reports are a category of information that must continue to be classified at the time the twenty or thirty year systematic reviews are conducted, and that you sign the attached letter on this policy to Dr. Rhoads, Archivist of the United States.

7a/ John F Blake

John F. Blake

Attachment: a/s

SUBJECT: Retention of Classification of Unevaluated Intelligence Reports

APPROVED (X) DISAPPROVED ()

A

Director of Central Intelligence

16 OCT 1973

Date

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Washington, D.C. 20505

78-3640/E

16 OCT 1978

Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Room 111
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Dr. Rhoads:

I am informed that our respective staffs concerned with the systematic review of permanent records for declassification under Executive Order 11652 mutually recognize that the release to the public of unevaluated intelligence reports would pose serious security problems. A risk is posed by the release of a number of reports, on a specific country or subject, which in the aggregate reveal CIA interests and scope of operations during a given time frame. In the report format, items such as "Place Acquired" provide evidence of operations of the Central Intelligence Agency or its predecessor agencies in a particular country, and source descriptions, even though general, pinpoint sectors within a country in which agents may have been reporting to the Central Intelligence Agency. If a report is released to the public without appropriate deletion of classified information, it can be expected that the revelations of operations would disrupt the relations of the United States with the country concerned, with attendant risk to present operations.

In consideration of these risks and consistent with the oral understanding reached by our respective staffs, it is my view that unevaluated intelligence reports require continued retention of classification unless sanitized to protect intelligence sources and methods and prevent any adverse impact that declassification and release of these reports could have on the foreign relations of the United States.

Accordingly, this is to advise you that pursuant to section 5(E) of Executive Order 11652 I have identified unevaluated [redacted] and field intelligence reports,

STATINTL

accessioned as permanent records to the National Archives and Records Service by other agencies, as containing information that requires continued protection beyond thirty years in the interest of national security. If these reports are subsequently requested under the Freedom of Information Act or the mandatory review provisions of the Executive order, they should be referred to this Agency for review for the sanitization of format and release of non-sensitive information.

I expect that this determination will serve to clear up the backlog of material to be reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 11652, although the matter of review pursuant to Executive Order 12065 will have to be addressed at a later date. Of course, my staff concerned with classification review stands ready to assist in any problems of procedure that may arise.

Yours sincerely,

Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

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Extracts from draft National Foreign Assessment Center
Guide for classification of information affecting the national security

Note: Prefatory comment in the completed guide will state that if the classification assigned by the foreign government concerned is higher than that assigned by NFAC, the foreign government classification will prevail in every instance.

1-301(b) Foreign Government Information

(1) Information provided to the United States by any element of a foreign government or international organization of governments, with the explicit or implicit understanding that the information is furnished in confidence.

(aa) Information provided by a foreign government on either their own officials or those of a third nation. ☐

25X1

Level of Classification: C

Duration of Classification: 30 years after classification.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(bb) Computer listings or bibliographies containing references to classified documents provided to the Agency by a foreign government which tend to show extent of exchange. ☐

25X1

Level of Classification: C

Duration of Classification: 30 years after classification.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(cc) Reports, the subjects of which are identified as the present or past incumbents of a position in a foreign intelligence organization not publically acknowledged by the foreign government. ☐

25X1

Level of Classification: C

Duration of Classification: 30 years after classification.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

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(dd) Assessments, analytical judgments, or discussions based upon foreign government information where such foreign government information is an essential element in the assessments, analytical judgments, or discussion.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: Review after 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(ee) Analytical comments on finished intelligence produced by foreign governments.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(ff) Memoranda and reports reflecting conversations with foreign representatives concerning substantive matters or organizational matters and which reveal extent of liaison and cooperation.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(gg) Visits of foreign VIP or foreign intelligence officers which reflect liaison and cooperation with US intelligence officials.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

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(hh) Foreign intelligence reports, photos, memoranda, and diplomatic reports passed through liaison to CIA by foreign intelligence representatives.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(ii) Cartographic, geographic, or environmental information supplied by a foreign government.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: Review after 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(2) Information produced by the United States pursuant to a confidential agreement with a foreign government or governments or international organization of governments, or with any element thereof, or produced jointly with a foreign government or governments under such an agreement.

(aa) Analytical comments on finished intelligence produced by foreign governments.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(bb) Letters and memoranda passed to foreign intelligence representatives accredited to Washington and letters, memoranda, and cabled messages to CIA field officers for liaison use providing US substantive intelligence or organization information.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Once passed, the documents become a part of the foreign intelligence exchange and reflect foreign government information as defined in the draft Agency Classification Guide.

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(cc) Memoranda and cables responding to foreign government inquiries on joint intelligence activities with foreign countries.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(dd) Briefings provided to foreign representatives in Washington which reveal liaison relationships and identity of participants.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: The fact that the briefings are provided on named topics becomes a part of the foreign intelligence exchange and reflects foreign government information as defined in the draft Agency Classification Guide.

(ee) All material that compares CIA estimates of foreign defense spending with estimates provided by foreign governments.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: Review after 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(ff) Foreign cartographic, geographic or environmental information produced under agreements with foreign governments or international organizations.

Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: Review after 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.

(3) Information revealing the existence of joint intelligence activities, facilities, or the nature thereof in foreign countries.

(aa) Memoranda, reports, and cables authorizing field officers to release CIA intelligence articles through liaison to host services or revealing extent of cooperation in joint activities.

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Level of Classification: S

Duration of Classification: 30 years.

Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years: Foreign government information.